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Abstract 16 
The question of how to define life has been an unresolved question in the philosophy of biology for 17 
many years, but developing a definition of life that is useful in both technical and everyday contexts 18 
has become more urgent as researchers around the world attempt to create fully synthetics cells in 19 
the laboratory, develop more and more intelligent and autonomous robots, and search for 20 
signatures of life elsewhere in the galaxy. Developments in these areas may end up overturning our 21 
current ideas about the distinction between life and non-life. It is therefore important to consider 22 
whether it is possible to develop a definition of life that encompasses currently known lifeforms, 23 
while at the same time having the potential to be applied to as-yet unknown lifeforms. Here, we 24 
discuss the pros and cons of some of the current approaches to defining life, then propose an 25 
alternative approach based on family resemblance. We also present preliminary data applying our 26 
new approach within a statistical modelling framework, and find that although living and non-living 27 
entities can be grouped according to overall similarity, it is difficult to find a single set of criteria 28 
which is sufficient for defining known forms of life while at the same time being inclusive enough to 29 
be useful in identifying or characterizing novel forms of life. We hope that the family resemblance 30 
approach will prove to be a fruitful alternative to traditional approaches to defining life. 31 
  32 
Introduction 33 
Imagine that you are reading a book or article and come across an unfamiliar word. If it is not 34 
possible to determine the meaning of the word from the context, chances are that you would look 35 
up the definition of the word in a dictionary. A typical dictionary definition includes a description of 36 
the meaning of the word, a list of possible alternative usages with examples of each usage, and 37 
probably a list of synonyms. Even an apparently simple word such as “chair” can be difficult to define 38 
if it has many possible uses depending on context. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary’s entry 39 
for the word “chair” is in fact over 5000 words long (Simpson and Weiner 1989). 40 
This stands in contrast to how children learn new words when acquiring language. All humans learn 41 
how to speak their first language through their interactions with other individuals, rather than by 42 
looking words up in a dictionary (MacWhinney 1999). The child’s mother might say “sit down on the 43 
chair”, and use a gesture to help indicate her meaning. In this sort of situation, the child receives 44 
information not only about how a “chair” looks, but also what it’s used for. Over time, the child will 45 
see many examples of different types of chair and learn what they all have in common (MacWhinney 46 
1999). Eventually, the child becomes able to recognize even rather unusual examples of chairs as 47 
chairs (Figure 1). 48 
This sort of learning process works well for words used in everyday situations, but what about more 49 
abstract concepts such as “life”? Technical and scientific definitions of the word “life” are necessary 50 
in various biological and chemical research fields, such as the origin of life (Pross 2016), but how well 51 
do these definitions align with a layperson’s definition of life that builds on personal experiences of 52 
life and death? Does it even matter if the technical and layperson definitions don’t align very well? 53 
Although the question of how to define life has been an important issue in the philosophy of biology 54 
at least since Aristotle (Barnes 1984), it is becoming increasingly relevant as a result of current 55 
technological developments. Researchers around the world are now engaged in attempts to create 56 
fully synthetic cells in a laboratory setting (e.g. Gibson et al. 2010, Hutchison et al. 2016), and 57 
coordinated efforts are being made to try to detect signatures of life elsewhere in the galaxy (Seager 58 
2014). Developments in these areas may end up overturning our current ideas about the distinction 59 
between life and non-life. It is therefore important to consider whether it is possible to develop a 60 
definition of life that is useful in both technical and everyday contexts, while at the same time having 61 
the potential to be applied to as-yet unknown lifeforms. We will begin by discussing pros and cons of 62 
some current approaches to defining life, then propose an alternative approach, and finally present 63 
preliminary data applying our new approach. 64 
Types of definitions 65 
The two examples of the definition of the word “chair” discussed above – an adult who looks up an 66 
unknown word in the dictionary, and a child who learns new words through personal experience and 67 
interactions with other people – exemplify not only two different ways of acquiring information, but 68 
also two different approaches to defining objects and phenomena. In the first case, the dictionary 69 
definition, it is assumed that an exhaustive list of criteria can be made which must be fulfilled in 70 
order for an object to be considered a member of the category “chair”. This is typically called a de re 71 
definition (Føllesdal et al. 1988, Lübcke 1988, Bernadete 1993, Retana-Salazar and Retana-Salazar 72 
2004, Thompson 2008). “De re” is Latin and can be translated as “about the thing”; it is often 73 
contrasted with “lexical”, or “de dicto” (lat. “about what is said”) definitions (e.g. Gayon 2010). A de 74 
re definition therefore attempts to capture the essential properties of a phenomenon, while the de 75 
dicto reference aims to capture how a term is commonly used. De re definitions are common in 76 
dictionary definitions of everyday objects, as well as in technical definitions of objects and 77 
phenomena within the natural sciences (it is, for example, possible to unambiguously define an atom 78 
of gold based on the number of protons contained in the nucleus of the atom). 79 
In the second case discussed above, similarities in form and function can be used to create an 80 
internal list of properties that a chair usually fulfils. A list of properties or criteria of this type is more 81 
fluid than in a de re definition. Not all criteria need always be fulfilled, the list of criteria can be 82 
dynamically updated, and criteria can be weighted differently depending on their relative 83 
importance. This more fluid type of definition makes it possible for us to recognize non-standard 84 
examples of chairs as long as they have enough in common with other types of chair we have 85 
previously encountered (Figure 1). This is an example of a family resemblance approach, where 86 
objects are understood based on their overall similarity rather than a list of necessary criteria 87 
(Wittgenstein 2001). Studies of language acquisition have shown that we generally use this type of 88 
approach when learning our native language (Medin and Schaffer 1978). The idea of family 89 
resemblance as a linguistic phenomenon was first developed by the philosopher Ludwig 90 
Wittgenstein (1889-1951) while working at the University of Cambridge in the early 1900’s. He 91 
wanted to investigate how we describe and understand complex phenomena such as art or games.  92 
A game is a deceptively simple concept. Everyone knows what a game is, but to create a list of 93 
criteria shared by all games, while still excluding non-game phenomena (i.e. a typical de re 94 
definition) is likely impossible. The diversity of different types of games is simply too large; there are 95 
board games, ball games, card games, video games, role playing games, games that are played 96 
alone, games that are played as a group, cooperative games and competitive games, etc. The only 97 
things that all these different types of games could perhaps be said to have in common is that they 98 
are entertaining and include some sort of element of competition (it must be possible to “win” the 99 
game, either by defeating the other team, the other players, or the game itself). But the same could 100 
be said of other types of phenomena, such as a structured debate, and it is not clear whether these 101 
properties apply to all sorts of games. This makes it difficult and perhaps even impossible to define 102 
games as a group in the same way as we define an atom of gold.  103 
Some writers have therefore suggested that we should instead use the family resemblance approach 104 
for constructing definitions (Neuman 2012, Pennock 2012), not simply considering it as an 105 
interesting linguistic phenomenon. Using a family resemblance approach, one could use the 106 
properties of the majority of games to create a more intuitive definition (although we will not 107 
attempt this here). Under such a definition, not all criteria would need to be fulfilled, as long as the 108 
overall similarity is sufficiently high. For example, solitaire could be recognized as a game using a 109 
family resemblance approach even though most games require multiple players, based on its overall 110 
similarities with other types of card game. 111 
”Fuzzy” definitions in biology 112 
Biology encompasses many phenomena that are difficult to define. What is a gene, or a species? In 113 
both cases different definitions are used in different contexts, because it is difficult to develop a 114 
definition that works in all contexts (Dupré 1995, de Queiroz 2005). When it comes to defining 115 
species, there are a number of different widely-applied species concepts, and introductory 116 
textbooks in evolutionary biology typically include several different variants, each with its own pros 117 
and cons (e.g. Ridley 2003). One of the most common is the so-called biological species concept, 118 
which states that individuals that can successfully mate and produce fertile offspring are members of 119 
the same species (Ridley 2003, de Queiroz 2005). However this definition is not useful for organisms 120 
that do not reproduce sexually, such as bacteria or parthenogenetic organisms (which reproduce 121 
clonally via unfertilized eggs; Dupré 1995). It also does not take into account the fact that there are 122 
many plants and animals which can hybridize with other closely-related individuals when given the 123 
opportunity. For example, tigers (Panthera tigris) and lions (Panthera leo) can hybridize to produce 124 
partially fertile offspring (female hybrids are sometimes fertile but males are not), but this does not 125 
occur under natural conditions since the two species are found in different parts of the world (Li et 126 
al. 2016). Although these two species could therefore potentially be classed as different populations 127 
of the same species according to the biological species concept, this solution is not embraced by 128 
biologists due to their divergent morphology, non-overlapping ranges (Asia versus Africa), 129 
adaptation to different habitats (mainly forest versus mainly savannah), and different social 130 
structure (solitary versus social; Castelló 2020). This simple example illustrates why many biologists 131 
embrace a pluralistic approach to defining species, where multiple possible definitions of what 132 
constitutes a species are acceptable, with different definitions being used in different contexts 133 
(Stanford 1995, de Queiroz 2005). 134 
One reason why finding a single definition of a species is so challenging is because life is so diverse, 135 
and different groups of organisms can have completely different ways of living and reproducing. But 136 
this is not the whole story. Speciation is also a gradual process, which means that differences in 137 
morphology and behaviour can sometimes arise long before two populations become so genetically 138 
different that they can no longer hybridize (Li et al. 2016). This makes it very difficult to pinpoint any 139 
specific time when organisms cross the boundary from being two populations of the same species, 140 
to becoming two different species. There are therefore considerable similarities between the 141 
problem of defining species, and the problem of defining life. If anything, defining life is even more 142 
challenging since the origin of life is so difficult to study, and there are many entities which may in 143 
some sense be considered borderline between living and non-living, including viruses, intracellular 144 
parasites, or semi-autonomous components of organisms such as sperm. 145 
Although we will not discuss it in any further detail, it is worth mentioning here the issue of “life” 146 
and “living” as the opposite of “death” and “dead”. Defining “living” versus “dead” is a question of 147 
individual status as alive or not, and is outside the scope of this work. Here, we are interested in 148 
being able to distinguish “living” from “non-living”, i.e. all organisms that currently exist, have 149 
existed, or may exist in the future, compared to objects or entities that have never been alive and 150 
never will. All non-avian dinosaurs are currently extinct, but they were alive while they still existed 151 
on earth. In contrast, a stone is not alive and never will be, so it would be nonsensical to call it 152 
“dead”. Nevertheless, some of the criteria that are traditionally associated with defining life versus 153 
non-life are also associated with defining living versus dead, making it difficult to discuss these issues 154 
completely independently of each other. For now, we intend to leave an analysis of the overlap 155 
between them to future work. 156 
How to define life? Problems and potential solutions 157 
Properties that are typically associated with life include, for instance, energy use, growth, 158 
reproduction, the ability to sense and react to the surrounding environment, and the ability to adapt 159 
to this environment (e.g. Solomon et al. 1993, Audesirk and Audesirk 1999). There are a number of 160 
biological systems that have some but not all of these properties, of which viruses are likely the most 161 
familiar. However other examples include transposable elements (DNA sequences which can copy 162 
themselves between different parts of the genome) or prions (proteins which can transform other 163 
proteins into the same configuration), both of which could be considered to carry out a form of 164 
reproduction. Apart from the difficulties arising from known cases such as this, the challenge of 165 
defining life is multiplied when trying to develop a definition which could extend beyond the known 166 
forms of life. It is only a matter of time before we will have to deal with practical problems 167 
associated with alternative lifeforms, such as autonomous robots, general artificial intelligences, or 168 
synthetic cells (Persson et al. 2019). More speculative, but still within the realm of possibility, is the 169 
discovery of extra-terrestrial lifeforms, for example microorganisms under the surface of Mars. We 170 
need to be able to recognize these alternative forms of life even if they may be very different from 171 
currently known lifeforms. This is unlikely to be possible using a de re approach. If we cannot agree 172 
on a set of criteria to define known lifeforms, how much more difficult will it be to find a unique set 173 
of criteria which unify robotic, synthetic, and extra-terrestrial life?  174 
There are several potential ways to move forward given these difficulties. We might decide to simply 175 
try harder, under the assumption that at some point we will have gained enough knowledge to 176 
construct a correct and all-encompassing definition of life. A problem with this approach is that all 177 
currently known life has a single origin (Pross 2016), which means that it may not be possible to 178 
determine which criteria are universal to all life and which are a contingent result of a common 179 
evolutionary history (Gould and Lewontin 1979). A second approach could therefore be to wait and 180 
see, i.e. put off trying to develop a single all-encompassing definition until we know what alternative 181 
forms of life it must include. Finally, we might decide to treat the definition of life in the same way as 182 
the species concept, and simply accept that life is too diverse for a single definition to be adequate. 183 
In this case different technical definitions of life could be developed depending on the context, such 184 
as the origin of life. The earliest biological systems probably lacked some of the criteria typically 185 
associated with modern lifeforms, such as the ability to sense the external environment (Pross 2016, 186 
West et al. 2017). Definitions of life that are used when researching the origin of life therefore tend 187 
to include broad criteria such as “energy use” and “dynamic equilibrium” (Pross 2016), rather than 188 
narrow ones such as “composed of cells” (Bedau 2010) or “contains information encoded in DNA” 189 
(Koshland 2002, Lazcano 2008, Bedau 2010). Given the ongoing discussion in the literature of the 190 
problem of defining life (Persson et al. 2019), none of these approaches seem to be particularly 191 
satisfying. We discuss why in more detail below. 192 
Try harder 193 
Although it may be valuable to continue searching for universal criteria for defining life, the question 194 
is how likely it is that this approach will succeed. Philosophers have attempted to define life at least 195 
since Aristotle (Barnes 1984), and if anything, the difficulties have increased over time rather than 196 
diminished as our knowledge has increased (Zimmer 2021). For example, whether viruses should be 197 
considered living has been unclear since their discovery, and is still controversial among biologists 198 
today (Choi 2008, Hegde et al. 2009, López-Garcia and Moreira 2009, Ludmir and Enquist 2009, 199 
Moreira and López-Garcia 2009, Navas-Castillo 2009, Forterre 2010, Herrero-Uribe 2011), even 200 
though most introductory textbooks state that they are not living because they do not have a 201 
metabolism and cannot reproduce outside of a host cell (e.g. Solomon et al. 1993, Audesirk and 202 
Audesirk 1999). Proponents of the view that viruses should be considered living tend to consider the 203 
ability to reproduce and adapt via evolution, as well as evidence of their relatedness to the rest of 204 
the tree of life, to be more important criteria (Hegde et al. 2009, Ludmir and Enquist 2009). An 205 
informal survey of 40 professional biologists of all career stages at Lund University revealed an 206 
almost exact 50-50 split on this issue (Abbott, unpublished data). Recent research has not helped to 207 
clarify the issue. 208 
There are three main hypotheses about the origin of viruses (Krupovic et al. 2019). One of the 209 
earliest hypotheses was that viruses are remnants of the most ancient lifeforms on earth, a 210 
transitional form between non-living organic molecules and living cells. Support for this hypothesis 211 
has decreased over time since it is hard to see how an entity that is completely dependent on living 212 
cells for reproduction could arise before the existence of such cells (Krupovic et al. 2019). A second 213 
hypothesis is that viruses arose from transposable elements that acquired the ability to transmit 214 
themselves horizontally (i.e. between unrelated individuals, rather than exclusively from parent to 215 
offspring). This hypothesis is fairly widely accepted since there are a number of structural and 216 
biochemical similarities between retroviruses and transposable elements (Biémont 2010, Krupovic et 217 
al. 2019). A third hypothesis is that viruses arose from bacteria or other intracellular parasites that 218 
lost more and more of their genetic material and independent functions as they became more 219 
dependent on their hosts (Krupovic et al. 2019). If this hypothesis is true, then this implies that 220 
viruses have evolved from living to non-living over time, which may be problematic for definitions of 221 
life that consider metabolism to be an essential criterion (Koshland 2002, Boden 2003, Bedau 2010). 222 
Recent work suggests that all three processes may have contributed to the origin of viruses 223 
(Krupovic et al. 2019), again making it problematic to definitively classify viruses as either living or 224 
non-living. Similar issues apply to mitochondria and chloroplasts, cell organelles with a bacterial 225 
origin – when does a symbiont transition from autonomous lifeform to cell component (George et al. 226 
2020)? We are therefore sceptical that the problem of defining life will be resolved if we simply 227 
collect more data. 228 
Wait and see 229 
As mentioned above, one of the reasons why it is difficult to define life is because we currently only 230 
have information about life on earth. We therefore cannot conclusively distinguish between 231 
properties that are truly essential or universal from those which are specific to our kind of life. For 232 
example, some definitions of life include the criterion that individuals should encode information in 233 
DNA (Audesirk and Audesirk 1999), or be composed of cells (Solomon et al. 1993). It is relatively easy 234 
to imagine that another type of molecule could be used to encode information rather than DNA 235 
(Pinheiro and Holliger 2012), but less clear whether it is possible for lifeforms to exist that are not 236 
composed of cells. Experiments with synthetic lifeforms may be useful in helping to investigate these 237 
questions, but these synthetic lifeforms will likely be highly influenced by existing life, partly because 238 
it is most convenient if they can be kept under ordinary lab conditions, but also because existing 239 
lifeforms are often used as templates for synthetic organisms (Osbourn et al. 2012). For example, 240 
Syn-3.0, a synthetic bacterium created by Hutchinson et al. (2016) is a highly modified version of the 241 
bacterium Mycoplasma mycoides, an intracellular parasite of cattle and goats. Synthetic biology is a 242 
fast-developing field, yet it is unclear how long it will take to develop synthetic lifeforms that are 243 
radically different from known life. 244 
Because of this, it would actually be much more valuable if extra-terrestrial life with a completely 245 
independent origin is eventually detected. But whether this is even feasible is currently unclear. 246 
Although it might be technologically feasible to bring back samples from Mars, either now or in  near 247 
future, there is a history of traffic between the earth and Mars both through natural (meteorites) 248 
and artificial (probes) means, which means that should life be detected there then there is no 249 
guarantee that it will have an independent origin (Sullivan and Baross 2007). It is also conceivable 250 
that lifeforms based on different chemistries could exist in other parts of the solar system, and be 251 
accessible for direct study at some point in the future (Sullivan and Baross 2007, Petrowski et al. 252 
2020). But here we end up in a catch-22 of sorts. Without a definition of life that goes beyond 253 
currently known types of life, how are we supposed to recognize these novel lifeforms? We can 254 
therefore conclude that although we will surely learn much if and when we create or discover 255 
completely new types of life, we cannot wait until then to develop a better definition of life. 256 
Accept that there cannot be a single definition 257 
Another option is to abandon the search for a single all-encompassing definition of life (Jeuken 1975, 258 
Oliver and Perry 2006, Mix 2015), similar to the plurality of species concepts that was discussed 259 
above. Such an approach would result in the development or refinement of multiple technical 260 
definitions of life, each of which would be most useful within a specific context. Different criteria 261 
could be included depending on whether the definition was to be relevant for the transition from 262 
pre-biotic chemistry to living organism during the origin of life, when an autonomous robot or 263 
artificial intelligence could be considered alive, or what minimal properties a potential extra-264 
terrestrial lifeform might need in order to qualify as such. The advantage of this approach is that it 265 
reflects the fact that life is a dynamic process which is difficult to capture using a limited set of 266 
criteria. 267 
However there are also disadvantages with this approach. For one thing, a single common definition 268 
of life would be very useful when discussing the challenges associated with novel forms of life. A 269 
definition of life which is broadly applicable and understandable for laypersons and policymakers as 270 
well as experts, would be an advantage during public debate of issues related to novel forms of life. 271 
This does not mean that a broad definition would necessarily replace the various technical 272 
definitions within a given field, but it might make interdisciplinary communication more successful. 273 
Another potential problem with existing technical de re definitions of life is that many of these 274 
definitions include criteria at different hierarchical levels of organization. For example, a typical 275 
textbook definition of life might include the criteria “energy use”, “growth and development”, 276 
“reproduction”, “homeostasis” (the ability to maintain a consistent internal state), and “evolutionary 277 
adaptation” (Campbell et al. 1987). Of these criteria, the first four can be applied to the individual 278 
organism, but the last one can only be applied to a population of organisms (Persson 2013). A 279 
population cannot undergo development from embryo to adult (other than via its component 280 
organisms), while a single individual cannot undergo evolutionary adaptation. This leads to an odd 281 
situation where this definition cannot sensibly be applied in its entirety to either a specific individual 282 
or to a specific population of individuals, calling its general utility into question. 283 
Some authors have attempted to resolve this problem by developing definitions of life in terms of 284 
systems rather than individuals, circumventing the issue of criteria which are applicable at different 285 
hierarchical levels (Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004, Weber 2010, Pross 2016). Since evolutionary adaptation 286 
is usually considered one of the most important properties of life compared to other dynamically 287 
stable non-living systems (such as a self-driving car, or the earth’s system of ocean currents), this 288 
means in practice that the system must be defined at the population level or higher. The advantage 289 
of such a definition is that it is more internally consistent, but this usually comes at the expense of 290 
being more complicated, imprecise, or unintuitive (Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004, Weber 2010, Pross 291 
2016). The question is whether the problems discussed above are because defining life is impossible, 292 
or are they a result of the traditional fixation on a de re definition? 293 
A case study of a family resemblance approach 294 
We would like to suggest that continuing to search for a broadly applicable de re definition of life is 295 
unlikely to be fruitful, and that it would be better to try a new type of approach which can 296 
accommodate the complexity of life as we know it. In our view, a family resemblance-based 297 
approach has better potential to achieve the aim of producing a broadly applicable and intuitive 298 
definition of life, since such a definition would be based on overall similarities across lifeforms and 299 
allow for occasional exceptions from specific criteria. A family resemblance approach could also 300 
allow for different weighting of criteria, for example if metabolism is considered to be a more 301 
important property of life than evolutionary adaptation (or vice versa). 302 
A potential weakness of the family resemblance approach to definitions is that it is not sufficiently 303 
objective. What if we cannot all agree on what or how much two entities need have in common, in 304 
order for both to be classified as alive? This is of course a problem, but not, we would argue, an 305 
insurmountable one. We have attempted to use statistical modelling to determine which criteria are 306 
most useful for describing life as we know it, while excluding criteria that are uninformative. Using 307 
this information, it may be possible to develop a definition of life that builds on specific 308 
combinations of criteria, rather than a single exhaustive list. Here we present preliminary results 309 
from a case study illustrating how this type of approach might work. 310 
Methods 311 
First, we compiled a list of suggested criteria for defining life from the primary literature, as well as 312 
from introductory textbooks in biology (see table 1). Descriptions of a phenomenon were considered 313 
to be equivalent to specific terms with the same meaning, such that “maintenance of their 314 
functional systems” (Allaby 1991) was considered equivalent to “homeostasis” (Campbell et al. 315 
1987). This resulted in approximately 30 individual criteria, some of which were variants on a similar 316 
theme; e.g. “evolves”, “adapt to environment”, and “natural selection” were considered separate 317 
criteria since evolution can occur through purely neutral processes and does not necessarily require 318 
adaptation to the environment or natural selection (Ridley 2003). We then selected a number of 319 
living organisms and other entities (including objects, processes, and organismal components) which 320 
were intended to span the boundary between living and non-living (see table 2). Next, we attempted 321 
to determine whether these entities fulfilled the criteria in table 1 or not. This resulted in the 322 
production of a data matrix where 1 indicated that the criterion was fulfilled for that entity, and zero 323 
indicated that it was not. Note that it was not always obvious how a given criterion should be 324 
applied to a specific entity (e.g. does a bacterium have purposiveness?), but we discussed these 325 
cases thoroughly and attempted to use our best judgement. We also scored each entity according to 326 
whether it is usually considered to be living or not (see table 2). This classification as “living” or “non-327 
living” is of course also open to interpretation, so in the cases where the answer was ambiguous 328 
(e.g. plastids or viruses), we carried out two sets of analyses – one more inclusive analysis where all 329 
ambiguous cases were classified as “living”, and one more conservative analysis where all ambiguous 330 
cases were classified as “non-living”.  331 
Once the data matrix was complete, we analysed it in various ways. All analyses were carried out in 332 
the R Statistical Programming environment (R Core Team 2020). First, we checked whether our 333 
evaluation of all criteria produced a useful descriptive result by carrying out a cluster analysis 334 
(Ward’s method using the hclust() function; Legendre and Legendre 2012, R Core Team 2020). We 335 
expected that successful scoring would result in living organisms clustering separately from other 336 
entities. Next, we carried out linear discriminant analysis (using the lda() function in the MASS 337 
package; Venables and Ripley 2002) to determine if it was possible to accurately assign entities to 338 
the classes “living” and “non-living” using the full set of criteria. If so, this might suggest that a de re 339 
definition is feasible after all. Finally, we checked which criteria were most highly correlated with 340 
classification as “living” using Spearman rank correlation (using the cor.test() function; Keough and 341 
Quinn 2002, R Core Team 2020), in order to determine which criteria may be most useful in 342 
constructing future definitions of life.  343 
Several of the criteria were found to produce exactly the same result when evaluated across all 344 
entities. For example, entities that fulfilled the criterion “metabolism” invariably also fulfilled the 345 
criteria “growth” and “stimulus response” (at least within this particular dataset). We therefore 346 
collapsed perfectly correlated criteria into single variables in order to reduce the dimensionality of 347 
the dataset for the linear discriminant and correlation analyses. The full (unreduced) dataset was 348 
used for the cluster analysis, in order to preserve complete information about relative similarity. 349 
However results were qualitatively similar when carried out on the reduced dataset (data not 350 
shown). 351 
Results 352 
The cluster analysis revealed that non-living entities generally did not cluster with living entities (see 353 
figure 2). However both main clusters included some ambiguous cases; for example, red blood cells 354 
and sperm clustered together with living intracellular parasite species, and viruses clustered 355 
together with non-living entities. This means that even using a more conservative classification of 356 
viruses as non-living, it is still difficult to clearly separate (more or less) autonomous living organisms 357 
from their component parts. The linear discriminant analysis confirmed this. For the inclusive 358 
classification dataset, entities were correctly classified as “living” only 44% of the time (14/32 cases – 359 
4 correctly predicted as “non-living” and 10 correctly predicted as “living”). Entities which were 360 
classified as “living” in this dataset tended to be misclassified as “non-living” in the analysis more 361 
often than the reverse (14 living organisms incorrectly predicted as “non-living” compared to 4 non-362 
living entities incorrectly predicted as “living”). For the conservative classification dataset, the 363 
criteria “feed” and “homeostasis” correctly predicted all cases. 364 
The criteria that were most and least highly correlated with our classification as “living” are 365 
presented in table 3. Results were somewhat different for the inclusive and conservative 366 
classification datasets. The only criteria that were among the top 5 best predictors in both datasets 367 
were “autocatalytic cycles” and “enzymes”. Poorly-performing criteria across both datasets were 368 
more consistent, and included “mutation”, “reproduction by self or non-self”, “order”, “adapt to 369 
environment”, and “natural selection”. These results suggest (1) that exactly which criteria are best 370 
for defining life depend on the specific set of lifeforms we wish to define, and (2) that criteria which 371 
are likely to be most useful for identifying novel forms of life (e.g. “reproduction by self or non-self”, 372 
“order” or “adapt to environment”) are unlikely to be sufficient for classifying known forms of life.  373 
Conclusions 374 
Consistent with our expectations, living organisms tended to cluster separately from non-living 375 
objects and entities in our proof-of-concept analysis. However the distinction between cell 376 
components and intracellular parasites was not particularly clear, consistent with our expectation 377 
that defining life based on a single set of criteria is not easy (figure 2). In addition, the poor 378 
classification results in the linear discriminant analysis of the inclusive dataset suggest, as discussed 379 
above, that simply adding more information does not necessarily help to resolve problems with 380 
separating life from non-life. Interestingly, there seems to be a trade-off between accuracy and 381 
broad applicability when attempting to define life. Very general criteria such as “natural selection” 382 
or “order”, which are expected to be most useful in the context of the origin of life or extra-383 
terrestrial life, were poorly correlated with classification as “living” or “non-living” in this dataset 384 
(table 3). This suggests that although it might be possible to develop a de re definition of life that 385 
encompasses all currently living organisms on earth, such a definition is unlikely to be useful in the 386 
context of understanding and characterizing novel lifeforms. 387 
This case study only includes a limited number of entities and criteria, and this will of course affect 388 
the outcome of the analyses to some extent. For example, correlations between criteria and 389 
classification as living will likely change depending on exactly which combinations of criteria and 390 
entities are included in the analysis. The differences in outcome between the inclusive and 391 
conservative classification datasets reflect this. Similarly, how each criterion should be interpreted 392 
with respect to a given entity is not always straightforward. For example, does a red blood cell have 393 
genetic control of development? Yes, in the sense that our genes control the development of our red 394 
blood cells, and that the maturing cell itself must actively express these genes in order to develop 395 
normally (Moras et al. 2017). But it would also be reasonable to argue that the answer should be no, 396 
in the sense that the red blood cell does not itself contain any genes when it is mature, and 397 
therefore cannot produce any new red blood cells via genetic control of development (Moras et al. 398 
2017). The specific results presented here should therefore be considered preliminary, and it might 399 
be necessary to reach some sort of consensus with respect to the evaluation of the criteria in order 400 
to obtain robust results. 401 
As presented here, our approach is mainly descriptive. However we do not feel that this is a major 402 
drawback. For one thing, any useful definition must be able to reflect our intuitions about life, which 403 
means that describing these intuitions is an important first step towards being able to construct a 404 
broad definition of life. An advantage of this approach is that it can also be applied iteratively, 405 
dynamically updating our descriptions of life as new information is obtained. In addition, further 406 
work could build on these results to help us get closer to a broadly-applicable definition of life. For 407 
example, which combinations of criteria best describe each cluster within figure 2? What happens if 408 
we include hypothetical examples of novel forms of life? Some authors have suggested that life 409 
might be a matter of degree, rather than a binary property (Hazen 2009, Bedau 2010, Jager op 410 
Akkerhuis 2010, Tirard et al. 2010). Would it then be more useful to include additional levels of 411 
classification than simply “living” versus “non-living”? There are many outstanding questions and 412 
possible directions to explore. Nevertheless, we hope that this case study of a family resemblance 413 
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  559 
Table 1: List of criteria defining for defining life obtained from the literature and from introductory 560 
textbooks in biology. 561 
Criterion Source 
Adapt to environment (Wingo 1963, Campbell et al. 1987, Solomon et al. 1993, 
Mader 2001) 
Autocatalytic cycles (Morowitz 1992, Fenchel 2002, Macklem and Seely 
2010) 
Boundary (Campbell et al. 1994, Greener 2008, Macklem and 
Seely 2010, Pennock 2012) 
Can die (Hansen 2008) 
Cells (Solomon et al. 1993, Campbell et al. 1994, Fenchel 
2002, Sadava et al. 2008) 
Chromosomes (Wingo 1963) 
Decrease in entropy (Wingo 1963, Morowitz 1992, Fenchel 2002, Moore 
2012, Pennock 2012) 
Development (Campbell et al. 1987, Solomon et al. 1993, Gould and 
Keeton 1995, Raven and Johnson 1996, Mader 2001) 
DNA (Campbell et al. 1994, Audesirk and Audesirk 1999, 
Fenchel 2002) 
Enzymes (Lawrence 2000, Fenchel 2002, Sapp 2003) 
Evolves (Wingo 1963, Campbell et al. 1987, Solomon et al. 1993, 
Gould and Keeton 1995, Audesirk and Audesirk 1999, 
Fenchel 2002, Sapp 2003, Greener 2008, Sadava et al. 
2008, Pennock 2012) 
Feeding (Greener 2008) 
Genes (Gould and Keeton 1995, Strickberger 2000, Sapp 2003, 
Sadava et al. 2008) 
Genetic control of development (Pennock 2012) 
Genetic material isolated from 
environment 
(Pennock 2012) 
Growth (Wingo 1963, Campbell et al. 1987, Allaby 1991, 
Solomon et al. 1993, Raven and Johnson 1996, Audesirk 
and Audesirk 1999, Lawrence 2000, Strickberger 2000, 
Fenchel 2002, Greener 2008, Pennock 2012) 
Homeostasis (Campbell et al. 1987, Allaby 1991, Solomon et al. 1993, 
Audesirk and Audesirk 1999, Sadava et al. 2008) 
Metabolism (Wingo 1963, Morowitz 1992, Solomon et al. 1993, 
Campbell et al. 1994, Gould and Keeton 1995, Lawrence 
2000, Strickberger 2000, Greener 2008, Sadava et al. 
2008, Pennock 2012) 
Movement (Solomon et al. 1993) 
Mutation (Pennock 2012) 
Natural selection (Greener 2008) 
Nucleic acids (Lawrence 2000) 
Order (Wingo 1963, Campbell et al. 1987, Gould and Keeton 
1995, Raven and Johnson 1996, Mader 2001, Sapp 
2003, Moore 2012) 
Organic molecules (Audesirk and Audesirk 1999, Fenchel 2002, Pennock 
2012) 
Protoplasm (Wingo 1963, Sapp 2003) 
Purposiveness (Pennock 2012) 
Regulatory mechanisms (Raven and Johnson 1996, Korzeniewski 2001, Macklem 
and Seely 2010, Pennock 2012) 
Related (Sadava et al. 2008) 
Replicate chemical information (Fenchel 2002, Moore 2012, Pennock 2012) 
Reproduction by self or non-self (not 
specified) 
(Campbell et al. 1987, Allaby 1991, Solomon et al. 1993, 
Gould and Keeton 1995, Raven and Johnson 1996, 
Lawrence 2000, Strickberger 2000, Mader 2001, 
Fenchel 2002, Greener 2008, Moore 2012, Pennock 
2012) 
Reproduction by self-replication (Wingo 1963, Morowitz 1992, Audesirk and Audesirk 
1999, Sadava et al. 2008, Macklem and Seely 2010) 
Stimulus response (Wingo 1963, Campbell et al. 1987, Morowitz 1992, 
Solomon et al. 1993, Raven and Johnson 1996, Audesirk 
and Audesirk 1999, Lawrence 2000, Mader 2001, 
Greener 2008, Pennock 2012) 
Use external substances (Campbell et al. 1987, Allaby 1991, Audesirk and 
Audesirk 1999, Lawrence 2000, Mader 2001, Fenchel 
2002, Greener 2008, Sadava et al. 2008) 
 562 
  563 
Table 2: List of entities included in the analysis of life. Entities indicated as “Yes/No” were considered 564 
ambiguous, and analysed separately as both living and non-living in order to see how this influenced 565 
the outcome of the analysis. 566 
Entities Classified as living? 
Arabidopsis thaliana (thale cress) Yes 
Caenorhabditis elegans (nematode) Yes 
Chlamydomonas reinhardtii (single-celled alga) Yes 
Clay crystals No 
Colloids No 
Danio rerio (zebrafish) Yes 
DNA virus (e.g. herpes simplex) Yes/No 
Drosophila melanogaster (common vinegar fly) Yes 
Escherichia coli (intestinal bacterium) Yes 
Gallus gallus (domestic chicken) Yes 
Homo sapiens (human) Yes 
Hydra vulgaris (freshwater polyp) Yes 
Liposome (phospholipid bilayer vesicle) No 
Macrostomum lignano (flatworm) Yes 
Memes No 
Mus musculus (house mouse) Yes 
Plastids (cell organelle, e.g. chloroplast) Yes/No 
Poecilia formosa (Amazon molly) Yes 
Prion (e.g. CJD-causing) No 
Red blood cell Yes/No 
Ribozyme (catalytic RNA) No 
Rickettsia typhi (intracellular parasitic bacterium) Yes 
RNA virus (e.g. HIV) Yes/No 
Saccharomyces cerevisiae (brewer’s yeast) Yes 
Snowflake No 
Sperm Yes/No 
Synechocystis sp. PCC 6803 (cyanobacterium) Yes 
Transposon No 
Viroid (e.g. tomato chlorotic dwarf viroid) Yes/No 
Virophage (viral parasite on other viruses) Yes/No 
Wolbachia (intracellular parasitic bacterium) Yes 
Xenopus tropicalis (western clawed frog) Yes 
 567 
  568 
Table 3: Criteria which are most (white rows) and least (grey rows) strongly associated with a priori 569 
classification as living versus non-living. Criteria with equal correlation coefficients are presented on 570 
the same row. A) Results when ambiguous cases are classified as “living”. B) Results when 571 
ambiguous cases are classified as “non-living”. Significant correlations are indicated in bold. 572 
A) 573 
Criteria Correlation coefficient P-value 
Autocatalytic cycles, Chromosomes, Genes 0.833 3.23*10-9 
Enzymes 0.832 3.59*10-9 
Movement 0.762 3.95*10-7 
Nucleic acids, DNA 0.745 9.87*10-7 
Reproduction by self-replication 0.698 8.96*10-6 
Mutation 0.494 0.00417 
Reproduction by self or non-self (not specified) 0.462 0.00773 
Purposiveness 0.361 0.0423 
Order 0.149 0.415 






Feed, Homeostasis 1.00 0 
Movement, Protoplasm 0.939 1.96*10-15 
Cells 0.881 3.03*10-11 
Growth, Metabolism, Simulus response, Regulatory mechanisms, 
Genetic material isolated from the environment 
0.825 6.52*10-9 
Autocatalytic cycles, Enzymes 0.770 2.50*10-7 
Nucleic acids, Evolves, Replicate chemical information 0.511 0.00278 
Mutation, Can die, Related 0.458 0.00837 
Organic molecules, Adapt to environment, Natural selection 0.402 0.0224 
Order 0.342 0.0551 
Reproduction by self or non-self (not specified) 0.275 0.128 
  576 
 577 
Figure 1: Spontaneous learning of the word “chair”. After seeing multiple examples of a given type of 578 
object, we learn to identify the important properties associated with this type of object. This later 579 
allows us to recognize non-standard examples of chairs. (All images obtained from Wikimedia 580 
commons.) 581 
  582 
 583 
Figure 2: Results of cluster analysis. Non-living entities generally cluster together at the right-hand 584 
side of the plot, and living entities at the left-hand side of the plot. However both main clusters 585 
include some ambiguous cases; red blood cells and sperm cluster together with intracellular parasite 586 
species on the left-hand side of the plot, and viruses cluster together with non-living entities on the 587 
right-hand side of the plot.  588 
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